Georgia's Strategic Reorientation Since 2022
By Malkhaz Matsaberidze
Wednesday, July 29, 2025
Since 2022-particularly following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine-a dramatic transformation has taken place in Georgia's foreign policy and strategic partnership priorities. Whereas the country's declared priority had previously been unequivocally Euro-Atlantic integration, in recent years the Georgian government has significantly shifted its direction. This shift is reflected in several key developments.
Despite being granted EU candidate status in 2023, at the end of 2024 the Georgian government announced that it would suspend the opening of accession negotiations with the EU until the end of 2028. This was followed by a de facto freeze in the integration process on the EU side.
Against the backdrop of deteriorating relations with the West, the Georgian government shifted its focus towards the East. In 2023, Georgia and China established a strategic partnership covering economic, logistical and political cooperation. Chinese companies were awarded strategic infrastructure projects, including the construction of the Anaklia deep-sea port. In 2025-2026, bilateral relations deepened further, with visa-free travel coming into effect, direct flights increasing, and agreements on a "comprehensive strategic partnership" being concluded between the two countries.
The Georgian Dream government has placed greater emphasis on strengthening the country's trade and transit functions. Diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries has intensified, with the aim of positioning Georgia as a key transit hub along the "Middle Corridor". Strategic partnership agreements were also signed with Hungary in 2022 and Armenia in 2024, reflecting the government's efforts to build new bilateral partnerships.
Georgian Dream has pursued a policy of avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. Georgia did not join bilateral economic sanctions against Russia. Direct flights between Georgia and Russia were restored, Russia lifted its visa requirement for Georgian citizens, and economic and trade ties between the two countries increased.
What lies behind this shift?
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created a new security reality in the Georgian government's assessment. The Georgian Dream government believed that, without credible military guarantees from the West, given that Georgia is not a NATO member, any direct confrontation with Russia could have catastrophic consequences for the country. The ruling party also developed a political narrative that the West and Ukraine sought to draw Georgia into a "second front" of the war.
Georgian Dream-led Parliament adopted several legislative packages, including the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which the US and EU viewed as democratic backsliding and legislation modelled on Russian law. In response to growing criticism, sanctions and political pressure from the West, the government increasingly confronted Western institutions and accused them of interfering in Georgia's internal affairs.
Western standards and the conditions set by the EU, including judicial reform, de-oligarchisation and changes to the electoral system, directly affected the concentration of power within the ruling establishment. The failure to meet these requirements contributed to growing conflict with Brussels and Washington. As a result, the government increasingly sought partnerships with countries that do not attach comparable demands for democratic reform, human rights standards or institutional transparency to their cooperation.
Against the backdrop of political estrangement from the West, Georgian Dream identified economic and transit alternatives in China and Central Asia. The war in Ukraine has made the transportation of goods via routes bypassing Russia particularly important. China needs alternative routes to European markets, while Georgia stands to gain investment and transit revenues. Cooperation with partners such as China, Hungary and Central Asian countries is also attractive because it is not tied to comparable domestic political conditions: these governments do not require Georgia to undertake democratic reforms or meet specific electoral standards.
The greatest weakness in Georgia's foreign-policy position is that the country has no formal military or security ally with a legal obligation to defend it in the event of aggression.
Even before relations with the West were frozen, the prospects for NATO membership remained uncertain, while the US Strategic Partnership Charter provided for assistance and training but did not offer direct security guarantees comparable to NATO's Article 5. Georgia's strategic partnership with China, meanwhile, is primarily economic and transit-oriented. China does not provide Georgia with a comparable military security guarantee, particularly against Russia.
As a result, Georgia remains militarily unaligned and geopolitically vulnerable.
The geopolitical cost of the Middle Corridor also needs to be considered. The Georgian Dream government is placing a major bet on the country's role as a transit hub, but this strategy carries its own risks. Close cooperation with Chinese capital and the transfer of strategic infrastructure projects, such as the Anaklia deep-sea port, could create risks of economic dependence, as Western analysts have frequently warned.
If regional conditions change and the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan are reopened, Georgia's position as a major transit hub could face greater competition, particularly if the country lacks sufficient Western investment and political backing.
The domestic political instrumentalisation of foreign policy has also become increasingly apparent. In Georgia, strategic partnerships are no longer simply a matter of foreign policy; they have become a central instrument of domestic political polarisation and electoral politics. For the ruling party, distancing from the West and closer ties with China and the East are framed as a means of "defending sovereignty", "maintaining peace" and "putting national interests first". The opposition views this process as the loss of a "historic opportunity" to secure Georgia's European future, potentially pushing the country back into Russia's sphere of influence.
There is also a clear disconnect between public sentiment and the government's foreign-policy course. Georgia's strategic partnership policy is increasingly marked by a divergence between public preferences and government decisions. According to major public-opinion surveys, including those conducted by IRI and NDI, a substantial majority of Georgians-around 70-80%-continue to support membership in the EU and NATO. As official policy increasingly shifts its emphasis from the West towards the East, this divergence risks creating longer-term internal instability and fuelling public discontent.
Georgia's current strategic partnership policy can be described as being in a transitional and uncertain phase. The government seeks to position the country as an independent transit player between East and West, but as it moves further away from Western political and security backing, Georgia increasingly finds itself exposed to the interests and influence of major geopolitical powers without a clear security cushion of its own.