An uncertain road to January 5
Wednesday, November 28
Twenty-two Georgians have filed to run in the January 5 presidential election, but this is looking to be a race between incumbent Mikheil Saakashvili and opposition coalition candidate Levan Gachechiladze.
That there is a real contest at all will catch some by surprise—international observers, taking down odds after the crisis of November 7 and Saakashvili’s roundly-applauded call the next day for a snap presidential election, have mostly presumed that Saakashvili is heavily favored to win a second term.
He is certainly stacking the odds in his favor: an imbalanced media environment, a campaign begun under emergency rule and the bountiful resources of government coffers are just a few of Saakashvili’s early advantages.
However, recent polling suggests that a Saakashvili victory, much less the resounding mandate he is aiming for, is anything but a fait accompli. [See an analysis of preliminary poll results in this Friday’s edition of the Messenger.]
But it is difficult to conceive of a Saakashvili loss. Never in its modern history has the nation seen a sitting president who wasn’t named Nino Burjanadze (now acting president for the second time in four years) hand over the reins of power willingly. A peaceful transition to a new president would be a novel experience.
Georgia’s first test of institutionalized transition could still be five years off; Saakashvili’s National Movement is a miracle machine compared to the poorly-organized opposition parties. The ruling party is sure to have success mobilizing voters on election day, and Saakashvili’s famed charisma has six weeks to win over the undecided.
But those will be a nerve-wracking six weeks. The National Security Council announced it will be meeting regularly, citing the risk of a provocation next month.
Looming largest is the impending decision on Kosovo’s status, expected to come shortly after December 10. If the region’s independence is recognized internationally, Russia threatens to do the same for secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia—a move Tbilisi officials say would amount to a declaration of war.
The government, the opposition, the separatists and Russia all accuse each other of plotting to destabilize the country. If the possibility of a dramatic turn of events weren’t troublesome enough, it does not help that Georgians will go to the polling booths already skeptical of the vote counters. In a survey done this August by the International Republican Institute, over half of respondents said they expected the next elections to be neither free nor fair.
While minor irregularities on January 5 could be ironed over, any serious questions over the legitimacy of a Saakashvili win could not only jeopardize his foreign policy agenda of Western integration, but more worrisomely endanger the security of the state.
Georgia needs these elections to go off without a hitch, regardless of who is ahead in the polls come election eve.
That there is a real contest at all will catch some by surprise—international observers, taking down odds after the crisis of November 7 and Saakashvili’s roundly-applauded call the next day for a snap presidential election, have mostly presumed that Saakashvili is heavily favored to win a second term.
He is certainly stacking the odds in his favor: an imbalanced media environment, a campaign begun under emergency rule and the bountiful resources of government coffers are just a few of Saakashvili’s early advantages.
However, recent polling suggests that a Saakashvili victory, much less the resounding mandate he is aiming for, is anything but a fait accompli. [See an analysis of preliminary poll results in this Friday’s edition of the Messenger.]
But it is difficult to conceive of a Saakashvili loss. Never in its modern history has the nation seen a sitting president who wasn’t named Nino Burjanadze (now acting president for the second time in four years) hand over the reins of power willingly. A peaceful transition to a new president would be a novel experience.
Georgia’s first test of institutionalized transition could still be five years off; Saakashvili’s National Movement is a miracle machine compared to the poorly-organized opposition parties. The ruling party is sure to have success mobilizing voters on election day, and Saakashvili’s famed charisma has six weeks to win over the undecided.
But those will be a nerve-wracking six weeks. The National Security Council announced it will be meeting regularly, citing the risk of a provocation next month.
Looming largest is the impending decision on Kosovo’s status, expected to come shortly after December 10. If the region’s independence is recognized internationally, Russia threatens to do the same for secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia—a move Tbilisi officials say would amount to a declaration of war.
The government, the opposition, the separatists and Russia all accuse each other of plotting to destabilize the country. If the possibility of a dramatic turn of events weren’t troublesome enough, it does not help that Georgians will go to the polling booths already skeptical of the vote counters. In a survey done this August by the International Republican Institute, over half of respondents said they expected the next elections to be neither free nor fair.
While minor irregularities on January 5 could be ironed over, any serious questions over the legitimacy of a Saakashvili win could not only jeopardize his foreign policy agenda of Western integration, but more worrisomely endanger the security of the state.
Georgia needs these elections to go off without a hitch, regardless of who is ahead in the polls come election eve.