Going through the motions?
By M. Alkhazashvili
(Translated by Diana Dundua)
(Translated by Diana Dundua)
Thursday, December 6
Russia’s time-honored threat to recognize Georgia’s breakaway regions came hurtling out of the State Duma even before all the ballot papers had been tallied following Sunday’s elections.
Remarks from senior MP and long-time President Putin ally Boris Gryzlov that the recognition issue could be discussed by the new parliament as early as January were met with a swift, but standard, response from Tbilisi: recognizing Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia is tantamount to a declaration of war.
Meanwhile, the de facto president of Abkhazia, Sergey Baghapsh, announced plans to step up the military presence at the administrative border this week, citing expected “provocations” from Tbilisi.
There’s nothing really new in this scenario. But timing is everything, and, with Georgia’s snap presidential elections slated for January 5, and Pristina threatening a unilateral declaration of independence for Kosovo by next week, the threat of a serious clash is more likely than usual.
It is hard to see what a war in Abkhazia or South Ossetia would do to help Saakashvili’s election campaign. True, a large-scale clash in one of the conflict regions might well have had the potential to divert domestic and foreign eyes during the days of unrest in early November, but since then, Saakashvili seems to be on a firm path to winning over portions of the electorate with promises on social issues.
As yesterday’s scramble for places on the government’s job-training program shows, Saakashvili’s election tactics—while condemned by an NGO as an abuse of state resources—are resonating with the population.
He probably knows he’s better off sticking to rhetoric: promises of the imminent return of Georgia’s separatist regions combined with trumping up the threat from the north.
For Russia, Kosovo is potentially a real catalyst for aggressive moves. If, as is likely, most of Europe and the US recognize the breakaway region as an independent entity in January, Moscow will be poised to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But Russia knows recognition could easily result in conflict. And it must be borne in mind that of all the world’s nations, Russia has the most to worry about when it comes to potential separatist states: it contains no fewer than 21 federal republics, some of which could well take the initiative and follow in the footsteps of Chechnya, if the Kremlin all of a sudden seems uncommitted to territorial integrity.
Remarks from senior MP and long-time President Putin ally Boris Gryzlov that the recognition issue could be discussed by the new parliament as early as January were met with a swift, but standard, response from Tbilisi: recognizing Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia is tantamount to a declaration of war.
Meanwhile, the de facto president of Abkhazia, Sergey Baghapsh, announced plans to step up the military presence at the administrative border this week, citing expected “provocations” from Tbilisi.
There’s nothing really new in this scenario. But timing is everything, and, with Georgia’s snap presidential elections slated for January 5, and Pristina threatening a unilateral declaration of independence for Kosovo by next week, the threat of a serious clash is more likely than usual.
It is hard to see what a war in Abkhazia or South Ossetia would do to help Saakashvili’s election campaign. True, a large-scale clash in one of the conflict regions might well have had the potential to divert domestic and foreign eyes during the days of unrest in early November, but since then, Saakashvili seems to be on a firm path to winning over portions of the electorate with promises on social issues.
As yesterday’s scramble for places on the government’s job-training program shows, Saakashvili’s election tactics—while condemned by an NGO as an abuse of state resources—are resonating with the population.
He probably knows he’s better off sticking to rhetoric: promises of the imminent return of Georgia’s separatist regions combined with trumping up the threat from the north.
For Russia, Kosovo is potentially a real catalyst for aggressive moves. If, as is likely, most of Europe and the US recognize the breakaway region as an independent entity in January, Moscow will be poised to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But Russia knows recognition could easily result in conflict. And it must be borne in mind that of all the world’s nations, Russia has the most to worry about when it comes to potential separatist states: it contains no fewer than 21 federal republics, some of which could well take the initiative and follow in the footsteps of Chechnya, if the Kremlin all of a sudden seems uncommitted to territorial integrity.