Georgia's Foreign Policy: Multi-Vector or Not Quite?
By Malkhaz Matsaberidze
Thursday, July 16, 2025
Georgian Dream describes its foreign policy as multi-vector, but critics argue that the country's current approach is better characterized as "asymmetric and forced balancing," which differs significantly from classical multi-vectorism. Whereas genuinely multi-vector states (such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) maintain balanced and stable relations with all major geopolitical centers, Georgia's current course is marked by a sharp weakening of ties with one side and the strengthening of relations with the other.
Viewed through the classic lens of multi-vector foreign policy, a state avoids exclusive alignment with a single geopolitical bloc and instead seeks to maintain relations with multiple, sometimes competing, powers. Such a strategy requires balancing competing interests while preserving strategic autonomy and maximizing economic and security benefits. At its core, it is about "not putting all one's eggs in one basket": maintaining relations with partners whose interests may at times diverge-including the European Union, the United States, China, Russia, and Iran-while avoiding open confrontation and seeking to maximize the economic and security benefits of each relationship.
Discussion of "multi-vectorism," "balancing," and elements of "neutrality" in Georgia's foreign policy is not a new phenomenon. Although the topic has gained particular prominence in recent years, debates surrounding it have historically unfolded in three distinct waves.
The first wave took shape in the 1990s, under President Eduard Shevardnadze, when discussions of a multi-vector foreign policy emerged in the early years following the restoration of Georgia's independence, particularly between 1993 and 1995. In the aftermath of the civil war and the conflict in Abkhazia, President Eduard Shevardnadze was compelled to pursue what became known as a "balancing policy." Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and agreed to the legal deployment of Russian military bases on its territory. At the same time, Shevardnadze began cultivating close ties with the United States, laid the groundwork for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, and declared Georgia's aspiration to join NATO. During this period, multi-vectorism was largely shaped by the country's security environment. While pursuing closer ties with the West, Georgia also sought to manage its relationship with Russia in the aftermath of the conflicts of the early 1990s.
The second wave emerged following the change of government in 2012 and unfolded during the period of 2012-2021 under the Georgian Dream government. The idea of multi-vectorism returned to the political agenda as Bidzina Ivanishvili's administration announced what it described as a "rational and pragmatic" approach to relations with Russia. At the same time, Western integration remained Georgia's primary foreign policy objective, marked by the signing of the EU Association Agreement and the introduction of visa-free travel to the Schengen Area. In parallel, efforts began to normalize relations with Russia in the economic and humanitarian spheres (through the Abashidze-Karasin format), based on the stated rationale that Georgia's "Western course should not provoke military aggression from Moscow."
The third wave began after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, marking a new phase in discussions around multi-vectorism and coinciding with the growing prominence of the Chinese vector in Georgia's foreign policy.
It was during this period that the government's rhetoric and actions increasingly came to resemble a multi-vector model.
In July 2023, Georgia and China signed a "strategic partnership agreement," which was viewed as an official signal that Tbilisi was seeking an alternative geopolitical pillar.
At the same time, relations with the West became more strained. Against the backdrop of the adoption of the "foreign agents" law and increasingly anti-Western rhetoric, multi-vectorism became a form of ideological justification for the government, providing a framework for explaining the deterioration of relations with Washington and Brussels.
While in the 1990s multi-vectorism was discussed as a forced attempt by a weak state to navigate its survival, today it is discussed as a conscious geopolitical choice, with the governing team arguing that the Western-led order is weakening and that Georgia should seek security and economic benefits in a new, multipolar world.
Why is Georgia currently pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy? The steps taken by the Georgian Dream government-including the strategic partnership with China, the restoration of flights with Russia and the deepening of economic ties, while simultaneously expressing a desire to "reset relations" with the West-are presented as indicators of a multi-vector approach. The governing party's calculation is that:
a. The global order is changing, and the West is no longer the only center of power.
b. Relying exclusively on a single vector (the West) increases the risk of direct military confrontation with Russia.
c. Chinese investment and access to the Russian market will bring the country rapid economic growth.
Despite the potential theoretical benefits, many analysts argue that this strategy carries significant risks for Georgia for several reasons:
Unlike Kazakhstan, Georgia's Constitution (Article 78) explicitly states that the country's goal is integration into the European Union and NATO. Multi-vectorism is often perceived as a deviation from this course. This creates a constitutional contradiction, as the pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy may be seen as being at odds with Georgia's stated Euro-Atlantic integration objective.
Another key risk is the potential loss of trust. When a country moves too close to the geopolitical rivals of the West (China, Iran, Russia), Western partners may view it as an unreliable partner and reduce security or political support.
In times of crisis-such as the war in Ukraine or US-China tensions-multi-vector states often find themselves having to take a clear position; otherwise, they risk becoming isolated.
Georgia's current foreign policy model can be characterized by several key features: One of these is the crisis with the West and an "eastward maneuver." This is the most visible characteristic of the current approach. The government states that it has not abandoned its commitment to Western integration; however, in practice, its partnership with the West has become significantly strained. Relations with the United States and the European Union are at their lowest point in decades, marked by suspended assistance and a stalled integration process. Against the backdrop of this crisis, Tbilisi has been actively seeking alternatives-looking to China as an economic and strategic partner while deepening trade and transport links with Russia.
Another key feature is pragmatism focused on domestic political survival.
Georgia's multi-vector approach does not stem solely from geopolitical ambitions; rather, it also functions as a means of maintaining domestic political stability and preserving the governing team's position. The West calls on the government to implement democratic reforms, strengthen judicial independence, and support civil society, which may create political risks for the governing team. China and Russia, by contrast, generally do not place domestic democratic issues at the center of their relations with Georgia. As a result, cooperation with them allows the government to pursue economic benefits without undertaking significant domestic political reforms.
In addition, the Georgian Dream government frames this approach as a means of "avoiding war," placing the policy within a narrative centered on security and conflict prevention. In the context of the war in Ukraine, Tbilisi's approach has been based on avoiding actions that could provoke Russia, including the restoration of flights and the decision not to unilaterally join sanctions. At the same time, Georgian Dream has accused the West of attempting to turn Georgia into a "second front." This approach makes the country's foreign policy less assertive or proactive, and instead more defensive and cautious.
The economic dimension of multi-vectorism is based on strengthening Georgia's role as part of the "Middle Corridor." The government seeks to transform the country into a hub where Chinese cargo, Russian energy resources, Central Asian wealth, and European markets converge. One example of this approach is the involvement of a Chinese state-owned company in the Anaklia Port project.
What does this represent in practice? Georgia's foreign policy today increasingly reflects a "transactional" approach to diplomacy-one focused on concrete political, economic, and strategic gains. The Georgian Dream administration has moved away from a values-based model of partnership with the West toward an approach in which relations with different actors, including the United States and the EU, are evaluated primarily through immediate political, economic, and strategic interests and tangible outcomes.
The main challenge is that, unlike Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan, 20% of Georgia's territory remains occupied by Russia, while the majority of the population and the country's Constitution support a pro-Western orientation. As a result, this form of "multi-vectorism" is perceived both domestically and internationally not as a balancing strategy, but as a potentially risky attempt to gradually move away from the Western orbit and draw closer to an authoritarian orbit.
Ultimately, Georgia's current foreign policy appears less like classical multi-vectorism and more like an attempt to renegotiate its relationship with the West while seeking alternative sources of support in the East. The Georgian Dream government appears to seek acceptance from Western partners without implementing the reforms they call for, while looking toward Eastern powers for additional political and economic support.