Why Has Discussion Around the Treaty of Georgievsk Intensified Recently?
By Malkhaz Matsaberidze
Monday, August 31, 2025
Recently, the Georgian Dream government has sharply intensified its messaging regarding the Treaty of Georgievsk-the July 24, 1783 agreement between the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. This push is led by positive statements from ruling party leaders, specifically Irakli Kobakhidze. The ruling team initiated a public discussion regarding the historic decision made by King Erekle II, stating that the treaty played a "crucial role in the survival of the state".
According to assertions by Georgian Dream government officials, against the backdrop of the severe geopolitical crisis and the aggression from Muslim neighbors at that time, this agreement preserved Georgia's chance for survival and physical preservation for a certain period. In their view, this historical example is often taken out of context, and it is essential to properly understand it based on the reality of that era.
Georgian Dream earned sharp criticism with these statements from the opposition, the non-governmental sector, and historians: critics believe that portraying the Treaty of Georgievsk in a positive light is linked to Russian political narrative and propaganda, because in reality, this treaty was followed not by protection, but a few years later (in 1801) by Russia's complete abolition of Georgian statehood, annexation, and the forced exile of the royal dynasty. In historical terms, many experts note that the treaty paved a "legal path" for Russia to abolish the Georgian kingdoms and bring the country into imperial space, which brought immense national harm to Georgia.
Mamuka Pipia, who openly positions himself as pro-Russian, is closely connected to Russian political circles (such as Sergei Gavrilov and other Russian deputies). When he voices such initiatives, critics consider it to be a Moscow-directed "probing"-that is, testing public opinion to determine how Georgian society would receive a new "treaty" of a similar format and subordination to Russia.
It is worth noting that statements like Pipia's often coincide with or follow evaluations of the historic Treaty of Georgievsk in a positive context by representatives of the Georgian Dream government (such as Irakli Kobakhidze). This is precisely the point highlighted by the opposition and civil sector: the ruling team's "justification" of the 1783 treaty and assertions that it saved the country give radical pro-Russian forces (such as Pipia) the legitimacy to demand the signing of a "new Treaty of Georgievsk" with Russia today as well.
For the vast majority of Georgian society and experts, this idea is perceived as an open threat directed against the country's sovereignty and European future: based on historical experience, the first treaty brought Georgia annexation and the loss of statehood. A "new treaty" from Russia's side practically means Georgia's full integration into the Russian orbit, the end of the country's Western course, and a return under Russian influence, which contradicts the Constitution of Georgia and the will of the majority of the population.
In short, such statements are not isolated incidents-they represent part of the hybrid and political propaganda aimed at gradually introducing to society and "accustomed" people to talks of a vassal alignment with Russia.
Is a new treaty with Russia being prepared at the expense of abandoning the European orientation while hiding behind the name of King Heraclius? This is where the main fear and evaluation of critics are directed. Although the official Georgian government states at the rhetorical level that European integration is its primary goal, a segment of society, experts, and the opposition see grave threats.
These doubts and scenarios are further reinforced by several key circumstances.
First, a shift in the historical narrative occurs when historical facts are altered and the Treaty of Georgievsk-evaluated as a catastrophe by the overwhelming majority of historians-begins to be justified and framed positively, laying the necessary groundwork. Critics believe this is done to lower the degree of fear and criticism toward Russia in the public consciousness.
Second, there is a clear manipulation of King Erekle's legacy. Using a historical figure and his tragic, forced decisions for present-day political goals often serves to justify past mistakes and adapt them to today's reality, creating the illusion that an alignment with Russia is once again the only way to survive.
Third, the role of pro-Russian figures cannot be overlooked. Open statements regarding a new Treaty of Georgievsk by figures like Mamuka Pipia are not accidental; they represent an Overton window tactic where radical pro-Russian forces voice what government representatives cannot say directly, even though their broader rhetoric prepares the ground for the idea.
Although no direct, tangible treaty has been signed yet, such synchronized messaging raises serious alarm within society that public opinion is being primed to gradually alter the Western course and return to the Russian orbit. Within Georgian political and public discourse, an argument is often heard that rapprochement with Russia or a pro-Russian course could be justified if, in exchange, the country recovers Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, given historical experience and geopolitical reality, this scenario raises many serious questions and doubts.
The history of Russian imperial and Soviet policy shows that Moscow never acts on the principle of "charity in exchange" regarding the return of territories and the restoration of sovereignty.
The occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region is not merely a "disagreement" that can be resolved through a one-time deal with Moscow-Russia recognized the so-called "independence" of these regions, stationed military bases there, and achieved virtually full integration into its space. For Moscow, these territories serve as the primary leverage to restrain Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. If Georgia abandons its Western course and fully submits to Russia, Moscow will no longer have an incentive to "return" these regions, as its main geopolitical goal-controlling Georgia-will already have been achieved.
Even assuming hypothetically that Russia returns the territories in exchange for a pro-Russian course, this would mean not the restoration of an independent and unified Georgia, but the return of a Soviet model where the country lacks real sovereignty, foreign and domestic policies are decided by Moscow, and the local government acts merely as a subservient administration.
The absolute majority of experts believe that rapprochement with Russia never guarantees the return of territories. On the contrary, it is a path at the end of which Georgia may lose the sovereignty and international support that currently assist the country in pursuing peaceful de-occupation.
There is no hint or readiness from Moscow regarding the return of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region-on the contrary, in recent years Russia has systematically taken steps toward the integration, or de facto annexation, of these regions through signed "integration treaties," border shifts, and the reinforcement of military bases.
Against this backdrop, the situation leads to two main conclusions. First, the notion that territories can be recovered through concessions to Russia or a change in orientation lacks all grounding in reality. Russia has never intended to restore Georgia's territorial integrity-its primary objective remains full control over the country and the halting of its Western integration. If Georgia abandons its Western alignment and sovereignty in the hope that "something will change," the result will be losing on both fronts: acknowledging the loss of those territories while surrendering its own independence entirely. This is why any attempt, historical or modern, to discuss returning to the Russian orbit remains unacceptable to a large segment of the public-it yields no benefits, only the ultimate loss of statehood.
Second, a "new Treaty of Georgievsk" serves Moscow's need for partial compensation amid its setbacks in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elections. With the severe war in Ukraine and strategic defeats, the Kremlin requires informational and political consolation. Restoring influence-or even securing a symbolic return-in the post-Soviet space would give Moscow a potent propaganda tool for internal and external audiences, creating the illusion that Russia still dominates the region.
"Probing" public opinion and preparing the ground aims to alter the political agenda during the election period and introduce to a segment of the population the idea of an alternative (Russian-orbit) choice.
This is a hybrid warfare tactic: when achieving goals through military means is constrained, Russia actively uses political, diplomatic, and informational levers to accomplish through so-called "soft power" or pressure what it fails to achieve on the front lines.
This is why critical discussion and timely recognition by society of such attempts and historical analogies (such as the Treaty of Georgievsk) are decisive for protecting the country's sovereignty and European course.